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BOOK REVIEWS
Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan by Karl J. Fields, Ithaca, Cornell
University Press, 1995, xv + 269 pp.
The task of abstracting lessons from the economic development of the Republic of Korea
and Taiwan has been underway for some time. But fierce debate continues on the question
of what the mechanisms of the economic development in the two countries were. One
group emphasizes the role of the market, comprising institutions like the World Bank and
the IMF, while the other, a group of political economists who have been referred to in
recent years as “revisionists,” emphasize the role of the state.
The two groups have taken up positions at opposite ends of the state-market axis, but are
similar in the way they lump Korea and Taiwan together. In other words, the former group
looks at economic development in both Korea and Taiwan in relation to market mecha-
nisms, while the latter, the revisionists, emphasize the intervention of the state in the two
countries’ economic growth. Differences between the two countries have been largely
sloughed off by both groups as being of only secondary importance.
The present work stands apart from previous studies in that, while the main currents of
political economy, it focuses on the differences between Korea and Taiwan. It is particu-
larly concerned with the points of difference in the enterprises and business groupings of
the two countries. Namely, though Korea and Taiwan share the fact that their economic
development was achieved through export-oriented industrialization, the driving force in
Korea was the formation of the huge business conglomerates called chaebol, while in Tai-
wan the crucial factor was the formation of business groups, the guanxiqiye (related enter-
prises), on a much smaller scale. This work posits as factors that gave rise to the differences
in these countries, both of which have capable and strong states, the proactive nurturing on
the part of the Korean state of the chaebol as the key institution of economic development,
and the Taiwanese state’s suppression of the expansion of the business groups.
The book consists of eight chapters. The first serves as the introduction, and the last as
the conclusion. The six central chapters cover three themes, with two chapters allotted to
each theme. First, the main features of the two types of business group are presented—the
Korean chaebol in Chapter 2, the Taiwanese guanxiqiye in Chapter 3. Korea and Taiwan
are compared with respect to financing in Chapters 4 and 5 and trading companies in Chap-
ters 6 and 7, respectively.
In the first chapter Fields presents a critique of the existing research in the field and lays
out the methodology employed in the present work, which is expressed in the concept of
“embedded enterprise.” Fields’s approach is to explain the differences in the business
groups in Korea and Taiwan in terms of differing political and cultural factors at work in the
two countries. However, with the exception of Chapter 1, most of the chapters in the book
examines political factors, and there are few explanations of cultural factors.
97BOOK REVIEWS
The features of the Korean business groups are outlined in Chapter 2. In terms of the
main theme of the work, the relationship between the state and business groups, Fields
shows how the Park Chung Hee regime, after it had given state-linked business groups a
position of absolute advantage through the Illicit Wealth Accumulation Law, used the
chaebol to power the country’s economic development. As they grew, however, the
chaebol became increasingly independent throughout the 1980s, and with advances in de-
mocratization from the latter half of that decade, the influence of the state has gradually
declined. Chapter 3, on the other hand, shows how in Taiwan the development of
guanxiqiye was suppressed by the strong state. As reasons for this policy Fields cites Na-
tionalist Party (Kuomintang) ideology (“Three Principles of the People”), a cautious atti-
tude toward state financing based on the party’s experience of inflation on the mainland,
and the fear on the part of the Nationalist Party, as outsiders, of an increase in political
leverage by the indigenous business groups.
Chapters 4 and 5 compare the systems of financing in the two countries. Fields considers
financing to be the state’s chief means of control over enterprises. Both Korea and Taiwan
are identical in that the state exercises control over in the system of finance. But while the
Korean state proactively used low-interest financing to promote economic development,
specifically development of the heavy and chemical industries, resulting in the growth of
the chaebol, in Taiwan huge conglomerates did not form because of the state’s cautious
subsidized financing. The informal sectors in both countries are also discussed in depth and
their relationships with the formal sectors under state control compared. And at the end of
these chapters the breakups of the Kukje group in Korea and the Cathay Trust group in
Taiwan, respectively, are analyzed.
The general trading companies in Korea and Taiwan are examined in Chapters 6 and 7.
Both countries adopted policies in the 1970s to foster large trading companies modeled
after the Japanese sogo shosha, but although general trading companies linked to the
chaebol developed in Korea, large trading companies (damaoyishang) failed to develop in
Taiwan. The main reason for this difference was that while Korean efforts were geared to
enhancing export performance and involved generous assistance, Taiwan policy goals were
never clear and support was weak. Chapter 8 lays out the above-mentioned conclusions on
the basis of an analysis of what has gone before.
This work presents a wealth of information on the differences between Korea and Tai-
wan and demonstratively discusses the reasons for these differences. Fields has put tremen-
dous effort into organizing the vast body of information collected here on the basis of very
clear logic. On two points in particular, its contrasting depiction of the breakup of the Ko-
rean Kukje group and that of the Taiwanese Cathay Trust group, and its comparative analy-
sis of the nurturing of general trading companies by the two countries’ states, this book
offers a fresh and interesting approach.
As mentioned above, in its focus on the differences between Korea and Taiwan, the
present work goes a step farther than previous studies. However, the very ambitiousness of
the endeavor also leaves considerable room for debate. And it is in the hope of stimulating
further research in East Asian studies that I put forward the following few points of argu-
ment.
In Chapter 1 Fields criticizes a tendency in the existing political economy approach,
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stemming from its assumption of strong states, to seek various causes in the state. My own
comment would be, however, that the present work itself has not adequately overcome this
problem. Specifically, I would suggest that by positing the strong state in the cases of Korea
and Taiwan, Fields has not been able to integrally explain the points of difference in state
policies and business groups and the common feature of high economic growth. I would
like to go more deeply into this point.
A key conclusion of this book is the assertion, first, of the existence of a decisive differ-
ence, particularly with regard to scale, between business groups in Korea and Taiwan. Sec-
ond is the assertion that this difference derives from the differences in the two states’ views
of their business groups and the resultant policy measures they pursued. In line with this
then, one sees the Korean state pursuing state-led economic development with the chaebol
as the driving force of every undertaking. On the other hand, the state in Taiwan, fearful of
the growth of private business groups, has tended to suppress their development.
This is a very neat conclusion. The economic development policies of the two countries
were different, but nevertheless they were able to achieve the common result of sustained
long-term high economic growth. Why? This question is particularly troublesome in the
case of Taiwan. Why was economic growth possible in spite of the suppression of private
business groups?
Questions of this sort cannot simply be ignored. Much of the motivation for studies into
the economic development of Korea and Taiwan stems from a desire to draw lessons from
their experiences, particularly in terms of policy implications. In fact, this issue is put forth
in the preface of the book. However, there is no clear answer to this question in this work.
The conclusion appears to be that the differing policies brought differences in scale of the
two types of business groups, but since in both cases high growth was achieved, it does not
really matter which policy is chosen. But is this really the case?
In my opinion, the missing factor which accounts for the present work’s failure to ac-
count for Taiwan’s economic development is chiefly supplied by the country’s small and
medium-size enterprises. The development of small and medium-size enterprises pro-
gressed spontaneously in Taiwanese society, without any direct connection to the state.
This has become increasingly clear through recent fieldwork carried out by Taiwanese soci-
ologists.
In other words, the chief factor behind Taiwan’s economic development is not to be
found in the state. I agree that the Nationalist Party’s government was strong with regard to
its suppression of development of the private business groups into huge groups. But I have
my doubts as to whether it had the ability to lead economic development. As this work
acknowledges, there was a deep gap between the Nationalist Party, who were outsiders, and
the indigenous Taiwanese society. In these circumstances it was difficult for the state to
take an active lead in economic development. In fact, the state’s mobilization of private
financing for its policy of promoting heavy and chemical industrialization in the 1970s did
not go well. Compared with the Korean state’s leadership of development, it was not so
much that the Taiwanese state lacked the will, but rather that it lacked the ability.
In terms of the policy implications, in the case of a country with conditions like Tai-
wan—that is, when there are limitations to state leadership on the one hand and a private
sector with autonomous development potential on the other—state-driven economic devel-
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opment like in Korea is difficult and in fact is not even necessary. In other words, policy
choices differ with the political and social conditions of the country, and the conditions of
enterprise groups varies as a compound result.
The problem with the present work is that, following the tradition of the political
economy approach, Fields assumes a strong state not only in Korea but in Taiwan as well,
and as a result fails to mention the role of small and medium-size enterprises. As I have
said, the political economy approach, which generally tends to concentrate on state and to
overrate state capacities, loses sight of the process of economic development taking place
in society unconnected to the state and excludes the possibility that at least part of the
reason for a given phenomenon lies not with the state but with the autonomous activities of
other social actors such as enterprises or industrialists, workers, etc. The present work does
not sufficiently extricate itself from the fetters of the political economy approach that it
criticizes.
Nevertheless, in its approach of focusing on the differences between Korea and Taiwan,
the present work is without doubt an opportunity to go beyond conventional studies. I hope
that my comments will help in this. (Yukihito Sat$o)
Industrialization and the State: The Korean Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive
by Joseph J. Stern, Ji-hong Kim, Dwight H. Perkins, and Jung-ho Yoo, Cambridge,
Mass., Harvard Institute for International Development, 1995, xi + 206pp.
Evaluation of Republic of Korea’s industrialization policy for promoting heavy and chemi-
cal industries during the 1970s has produced a great deal of debate within the field of devel-
opmental economics. Among neoclassical economists who see Korea’s economic develop-
ment as a result of the promotion of economic liberalization, the policy is viewed as nothing
more than a deviation along the country’s path to successful industrialization. For them this
is exemplified by the low efficiency of the heavy and chemical sectors in the 1970s, and
they look upon the recession at the start of the 1980s as a result of this mistaken policy. On
the other hand, those who see the government as having an important role in economic
development and who emphasize the efficacy of industrial policy have been positive in
their evaluation of Korea’s heavy and chemical industrialization policy. They have stressed
the importance of long-term over short-term efficiency and look upon the concentration of
investment in the heavy and chemical sectors during the 1970s as preparation for the high
growth of the late 1980s. This new book delves in a very straightforward way into this
ongoing debate.
In the Introduction the authors comprehend the problem of evaluating Korea’s heavy and
chemical industrialization policy as a matter of gauging the success or failure of selective
industrial policy by government. They employ the technique of project appraisal, and pro-
vide a definition and evaluation of industrial targeting. In effect they estimate shadow price
and calculate a project’s ex ante economic rate of return. Projects where this exceeds the
